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Abstract 
During times of bank distress, authorities often engage in regulatory interventions and provide 
capital  support  to  reduce  bank  risk  taking.    An  unintended  effect  of  such  actions  may  be  a 
reduction in bank liquidity creation, with possible adverse consequences for the economy as a 
whole.  This paper tests hypotheses regarding the effects of regulatory interventions and capital 
support on bank risk taking and liquidity creation using a unique dataset over the period 1999-
2009.  We find that both types of actions are generally associated with statistically significant 
reductions in risk taking and liquidity creation in the short run and long run.  While the effects of 
regulatory interventions are also economically significant, the effects of capital support are only 
economically significant in the long run.  Thus, both types of actions have important intended 
and unintended consequences with implications for policymakers. 
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Introduction 
During  times  of  bank  distress,  authorities  often  intervene  in  banks  and  may  also  provide 
capital support in order to reduce bank risk taking (e.g., Dahl and Spivey (1995); Bhattacharya, 
Boot, and Thakor (1998); Oshinsky and Olin (2005); Giannetti and Simonov (2010); Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2010)).
1  However, a potential unintended consequence of these actions may be that 
banks create less liquidity by, for example, making fewer loans, issuing fewer loan commitments, 
or shifting into liquid assets.  This may not be desirable given that liquidity creation is one of 
banks’ raisons d’être (e.g., Bryant (1980); Diamond and Dybvig, (1983); Boot, Greenbaum, and 
Thakor (1993); Holmstrom and Tirole (1998); Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002)),
2 and reduced 
liquidity  creation may have negative consequences for the  macroeconomy (Bernanke (1983); 
Gibson  (1995);  Ongena,  Smith,  and  Michalsen  (2003);  Dell’Ariccia,  Detragiache,  and  Rajan 
(2008); Khwaja and Mian (2008); Chava and Purnanandam (2011)).  Understanding whether 
regulatory interventions and capital support succeed in inducing banks to reduce their risk taking, 
and what the consequences are for bank liquidity creation is critical for academics, regulatory 
authorities, and policymakers (e.g., Webb (2000); Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007); Bank 
of England (2008); Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2009)).  Nonetheless, the effects of both 
types of actions are not well understood. 
The  key  question  we  ask  in  this  paper  therefore  is:  What  are  the  effects  of  regulatory 
interventions and capital support on bank risk taking and liquidity creation?  Addressing this 
question  informs  the  current  debate  about  the  efficacy  of  different  ways  of  intervening  and 
dealing with distressed banks and helps fill a gap in the literature that lacks empirical evidence on 
whether regulatory interventions and capital support are beneficial.   
While regulatory interventions and capital support take place in many countries, data on such 
actions are typically impossible to obtain and previous studies are therefore usually confined to 
analyzing the effects of laws and regulations on bank soundness (e.g., Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004); Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008)).  We use a unique dataset from the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (the German central bank) which covers the entire universe of German 
                                                           
1   Other benefits include avoiding gridlock in the payments system, restoring financial market confidence, and 
enhancing  systemic  stability.  These  latter  factors  benefit  the  real  economy  and  it  is  not  uncommon  that 
governments justify such interventions and capital support measures on the grounds that “Saving Wall Street is a 
considered necessary step to help Main Street” as Giannetti and Simonov (2010, p. 1) put it.  
2   Another key role of banks is to transform risk (e.g., Diamond (1984); Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984); Boyd 
and Prescott (1986)). -2-  
 
banks for the period 1999-2009.   The specific advantage of our dataset is that it contains a 
complete set of information on all the interventions and all the capital support provided.  Over 
this  time  period,  regulatory  authorities  intervened  in  17%  of  all  banks,  and  provided  capital 
support (averaging 18% of their Tier 1 capital) to 14% of all banks.  Thus, a sizeable proportion 
of banks received interventions and capital support, allowing for meaningful analyses. 
To  address  how  the  different  actions  affect  banks’  risk  taking  and  liquidity  creation,  we 
formulate hypotheses and test them using ordered logit models in which we regress the changes 
in risk taking and liquidity creation on a regulatory intervention dummy, the amount of capital 
support received (if any), and a set of control variables.  We focus on substantial changes in risk 
taking and liquidity creation, defined as changes of at least 3%.  
By way of preview, we find that regulatory interventions and capital support are generally 
associated with statistically significant reductions in both risk taking and liquidity creation in the 
short  run  and  long  run.    While  the  effects  of regulatory  interventions  are  also  economically 
significant, the effects of capital support are only economically significant in the long run.     
We  perform  a  number  of  additional  analyses  in  which  we  run  regressions  separately  for: 
different bank pillars (i.e., private, public, and cooperative banks); small banks (total assets below 
the median of € 329 million) and large banks (total assets above the median); poorly- and better-
capitalized banks (split at the median bank’s balance sheet equity capital ratio of 8.73%); and 
crisis years (2001 and 2007-2009) and non-crisis years (1999-2000 and 2002-2006).   
To assess robustness of our results, we perform several sensitivity analyses.  First, we use 
alternative cutoffs to define what constitutes a substantial change in risk taking and liquidity 
creation.  Second, we run regressions for subsamples of merged and non-merged banks.  Third, 
we use alternative measures of risk taking and liquidity creation.  Fourth, to deal with a potential 
endogeneity issue (bank distress may result in both regulatory interventions and capital support 
on the one hand, and reductions in risk taking and liquidity creation on the other hand), we use 
lagged regulatory interventions and lagged capital support in our main regressions.  Recognizing 
that this may not be sufficient, we also run instrumental variable regressions.  In all cases, we 
obtain results that are similar to the main findings.   
We emphasize that although we use German data, our results are likely representative for a 
broad number of countries, including the U.S., Japan, and various European countries.  To see -3-  
 
that, it is important to note that Germany has many small- and medium-sized banks that provide 
financial services in local areas (Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011)).  That also holds for the U.S., 
where the vast majority of all banks are considered to be community banks that are the primary 
providers of credit for small- and medium-sized businesses.  These community banks are locally 
owned  and  operated  like  savings  and  cooperative  banks  in  Germany.    Japan  and  various 
European countries including Austria, Switzerland, Italy, France, and Spain, also have similar 
financial institutions, regulations, and economic environments as Germany.  In addition, all those 
countries exhibit similarities in terms of dealing with distressed banks.  Regulatory interventions 
of various forms, and capital support measures have been repeatedly observed in the U.S., Japan, 
and in many European economies (e.g., Oshinsky and Olin (2005); Berrospide and Edge (2010); 
Giannetti and Simonov (2010); Hoshi and Kashyap (2010); Stolz and Wedow (2010)).   
 Our paper is related to the studies about prompt corrective action and regulator’s closure 
policies (e.g., Boot and Thakor (1993); Mailath and Mester (1994); Dahl and Spivey (1995); Noe, 
Rebello, and Wall (1996); Aggarwal and Jacques (2001)), and on the effect of capital support on 
banks’ lending behavior (e.g., Berrospide and Edge (2010); Giannetti and Simonov (2010)).  To 
our knowledge, this paper is the first study that sheds light on how regulatory interventions and 
capital  support  affect  bank  risk  taking  and  liquidity  creation.    By  examining  the  effects  of 
regulatory interventions and capital support on risk taking, we address an issue of first-order 
importance. By focusing on the effects of these actions on liquidity creation instead of examining 
their effects on lending behavior, our research takes a more holistic perspective using a superior 
concept of bank output that includes all on- and off-balance sheet activities. 
We organize the paper as follows: Section I provides a brief overview of the German banking 
sector and the regulatory interventions and capital support provided during our sample period.  
Section II develops our hypotheses.  Section III describes the regression framework, data, and 
variables.  Section IV reports our main empirical results for the short-run effects of regulatory 
interventions  and  capital  support  on  bank  risk  taking  and  liquidity  creation,  and  includes 
additional analyses and robustness checks.  In Section V, we examine the long-run effects of 
regulatory interventions and capital support.  Concluding remarks are offered in Section VI.   
 
   -4-  
 
I.  Institutional background, regulatory interventions, and capital support 
This section first describes the institutional background of the German banking system.  It 
then discusses the actions taken by the government and bankers associations in response to bank 
distress, i.e., regulatory interventions and capital support.   
A.   German banking system 
Germany has a bank-based financial system, where retail and corporate customers depend 
heavily on liquidity provision by financial institutions (Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell (1999)).  
The German banking sector consists of three pillars: private banks, public sector banks, and 
credit cooperatives.  While all these banks are universal banks, the three pillars differ in terms of 
ownership structure (Brunner, Decressin, Hardy, and Kudela (2004)). The private bank pillar 
contains large nationwide banks, regional banks, and branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks.  
The  larger  private  banks  are  organized  as  joint-stock  companies  whereas  their  smaller 
counterparts are partnerships, private limited companies or even sole proprietors.  The public 
sector banks include savings banks and Landesbanks owned by governments at the city-, county-, 
or state-level.  The cooperative banking pillar comprises cooperative banks and central credit 
cooperatives.  These banks are organized as mutuals.  Additional details about these different 
types  of  institutions  –  particularly  with  respect  to  geographical  reach  and  type  of  business 
activities – are provided in Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux (2001), and Puri et al. (2011).
3   
Each  banking  pillar  has  its  own  bankers  associations.  In  addition  to  three  umbrella 
organizations in each pillar, there are a number of bankers associations at the state and regional 
level. Together, they operate a tightly-knit framework of support schemes (Brunner et al. (2004); 
Puri  et  al.  (2011)).  Across  the  three  pillars,  these  support  schemes  not  only  offer  deposit 
insurance coverage that exceeds the statutory required coverage of € 20,000 per depositor per 
bank, but – important for our paper – they also provide distressed institutions with capital support 
to avoid disruptions of confidence in the system that would arise from closures.   
                                                           
3   The large private banks tend to operate national branch office networks, whereas smaller private banks operate in 
local or regional markets.  Savings banks operate in locally delimited areas.  They are linked to Landesbanks in 
three  ways.    First,  Landesbanks  are  partially  owned  by  savings  banks  and,  second,  they  provide  wholesale 
services to savings banks.  Third, Landesbanks offer services to the savings banks’ customers that the local 
savings banks are not able to provide, e.g., international banking and securities business.  Cooperative banks also 
operate in local banking markets.  The central credit cooperatives are owned by the local cooperative banks.  The 
key task of the central cooperatives is similar to the role of Landesbanks for the savings banks.   -5-  
 
B.  Actions by the government and bankers associations: Regulatory interventions and capital 
support 
Supervision  of  banks  in  Germany  is  the  joint  responsibility  of  the  Federal  Financial 
Supervisory Authority and the Deutsche Bundesbank.  Based on financial statement data, audit 
reports,  and  on-site  examinations,  the  Bundesbank  collects  and  processes  information  about 
banks’ operations and their financial positions.  When banks violate the principles of the Banking 
Act,
4 the Bundesbank forwards this information to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, 
which is ultimately responsible for all disciplinary actions against banks.   
The actions by the  Federal  Financial Supervisory Authority depend on the severity of the 
recorded violations.  In case of minor violations, it may intensify supervision or issue warnings 
and conduct hearings of the bank’s board of directors.  If the violations are more serious, it may 
take actions such as prohibiting the origination of new loans or dismissing senior executives.  
Before  such  serious  interventions  into  the  bank’s  business  activities  take  place,  the  Federal 
Financial  Supervisory  Authority  typically  gives  the  bank  time  to  correct  the  deficiencies  by 
issuing a warning letter.  Neither the serious nor the weaker interventions are publicly known, but 
they are available in our dataset.  Our empirical tests focus on the serious interventions by the 
regulator because such intrusions into their business operations are more likely to significantly 
affect  banks’  risk  taking  and  their  ability  to  create  liquidity  than  mere  warning  letters  and 
intensified supervision.
5   
The government and the bankers associations may also provide capital support to distressed 
banks to prevent them from failing and to stabilize the financial system.  The government did this 
during the recent financial crisis.  It set up a Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) which 
provided capital support mainly to large private banks and to the Landesbanken.
6  The bankers 
associations provided capital support to their members over our entire sample period from 1999-
2009.
7  Our empirical analysis combines the capital support by the government and the bankers 
associations.  However, the results are not driven by this combination.   
                                                           
4   The Banking Act is the statutory banking supervision guide for banks in Germany.   
5    In unreported regressions, we confirm that risk taking and liquidity creation are not significantly affected when 
weak measures are administered by the Federal Financial Services Supervisory Agency.   
6    SoFFin also provided guarantees and purchased securities via open market operations.   
7   The insurance schemes of the bankers associations obtain information about bank soundness either indirectly 
from the auditors or directly from the regulatory authorities. If a member institution is considered unsound, the 
support scheme often injects capital and informs the regulator. The member banks are obliged to disclose any -6-  
 
Capital restoration measures are publicly known, as they are reported in the banks’ financial 
statements.  Bankers associations are normally aware of regulatory interventions at an early stage, 
and vice versa.  There is no predetermined ordering with respect to the timing of when regulatory 
interventions and capital support take place.  Capital support may precede or follow regulatory 
interventions, and either may occur without the other.   
 
II.  Hypothesis development 
This section develops our risk-taking and liquidity-creation hypotheses. 
A.  Risk-taking hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis focuses on the fact that the primary concern of regulators is to limit undue 
risk taking.  The reason is that regulatory authorities aim to avoid losses to the deposit insurer, 
lower resolution costs, incentivize healthy banks to avoid becoming distressed, and reduce the 
number of failures (e.g., James  (1987); Dahl and Spivey  (1995)).   To achieve this, they  are 
equipped with the power to revoke the bank license in extreme cases, and the threat thereof can 
trigger  portfolio  adjustments  and  affect  future  asset  choices  in  banks  (Mailath  and  Mester 
(1994)).  While banks may not face the immediate threat of closure, we argue that imposing 
restrictions on certain activities likely limits a bank’s scope for undertaking such activities.  We 
therefore expect risk taking to decline after interventions.  Risk taking may also decline due to 
increased  regulatory  monitoring  after  an  intervention.    We  formulate  our  first  hypothesis  as 
follows:      
H1.  Regulatory  Intervention  Risk  Reduction  Hypothesis:  Regulatory  interventions  are 
associated with reductions in risk taking.   
Capital support is generally given to enhance the survival odds of ailing institutions.  Capital 
support has two components: an injection of capital and increased post-injection monitoring of 
the bank.   
While it is expected that post-capital-injection monitoring of the bank by a regulator or a 
bankers association would lead to lower risk, the theoretical literature is divided on whether 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
information to the bankers association that is necessary to allow for a transparent assessment of the bank’s 
financial position (see Dam and Koetter (2011)).  -7-  
 
higher capital by itself reduces bank risk.  One set of theories argues that higher bank capital goes 
hand in hand with lower bank risk taking.  Morrison and White (2005) focus on moral hazard.  
The idea in their paper is that if banks do not have enough equity at stake, they may be tempted to 
make excessively risky investments.  Higher capital reduces such moral hazard incentives and 
hence  should  lead  to  reduced  risk  taking.    Other  papers  reach  a  similar  conclusion,  but  by 
focusing on the strengthened bank monitoring incentives that accompany higher bank capital 
(Holmstrom  and  Tirole  (1997),  Allen,  Carletti  and  Marquez  (forthcoming),  and  Mehran  and 
Thakor (forthcoming)).  
Other theories argue that higher bank capital may be accompanied by an increase in bank risk 
taking.  This may occur if banks react to the higher capital by shifting into riskier portfolios and 
are not prevented from doing so by regulators (e.g., Koehn and Santomero (1980)).  Calomiris 
and Kahn (1991) also show that a capital structure with sufficiently high demand deposits (and 
by implication lower equity) leads to more effective monitoring of bank managers by informed 
depositors and hence a smaller likelihood of bad investment decisions.  Thus, banks with higher 
capital, and consequently a lower proportion of the portfolio financed by demandable deposits, 
may operate with higher credit risk and insolvency risk.
8   
Thus, theoretically the combined effect of higher capital in the bank and greater post-capital-
injection monitoring of the bank could go either way, depending on whether the incentive effect 
of higher capital on the bank dominates the effect of the loss of creditor discipline due to higher 
capital.  We summarize this as the following hypotheses, but note that we can only measure the 
net effect: 
 H2a.  Capital Support Risk Reduction Hypothesis: Capital support is associated with 
reductions in risk taking.   
H2b.    Capital  Support  Risk  Increase  Hypothesis:  Capital  support  is  associated  with 
increases in risk taking.   
B.  Liquidity-creation hypotheses 
While Germany, unlike the U.S., does not have a formal framework for prompt corrective 
action that ties individual regulatory measures to thresholds in terms of bank capitalization, the 
                                                           
8   See Freixas and Rochet (2008) for an overview on the literature on the market discipline role of bank leverage. -8-  
 
measures taken against distressed institutions in Germany (see Section III C below) resemble 
several of the actions taken by the authorities in the U.S.
9 For instance, restrictions on asset 
growth,  deposit  taking,  dismissals  of  senior  executives,  and  other  instructions  to  restructure 
business activities are observed in Germany as well as in the U.S. The types of interventions 
follow the principle that serious manifestations of distress trigger more extensive sanctions by the 
regulator (e.g., Dahl and Spivey (1995)); Aggarwal and Jacques (2001)).  Since any one of those 
active interventions into the banks’ operations are likely to impede the scope and scale of banks’ 
activities,  we  hypothesize  that  regulatory  interventions  have  a  negative  effect  on  liquidity 
creation:  
H3. Regulatory  Discipline  Hypothesis:  Regulatory  interventions  are  associated  with 
reductions in liquidity creation. 
On the issue of how bank capital affects liquidity creation, the theoretical literature provides 
opposing predictions.  We turn to these theories to extract hypotheses on how capital support is 
expected to affect liquidity creation. 
Some theories posit that bank capital  may impede liquidity creation because it  makes the 
bank’s capital structure less fragile.  A fragile capital structure encourages the bank to commit to 
monitoring its borrowers, and hence allows it to extend loans.  Additional equity capital makes it 
harder for the less-fragile bank to commit to monitoring, which in turn hampers the bank’s ability 
to  create  liquidity  (e.g.,  Diamond  and  Rajan  (2000,  2001)).    We  refer  to  these  ideas  as  the 
‘financial fragility’ theory.   
Other theories focus on banks’ role as risk transformers.  They argue that liquidity creation 
exposes banks to risk (Allen and Santomero (1998); Allen and Gale (2004)), and that higher 
capital improves banks’ ability to absorb risk (e.g., Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993); Repullo 
(2004); von Thadden (2004); Coval and Thakor (2005)), so higher capital ratios may allow banks 
to create more liquidity.  We refer to these collectively as the ‘risk absorption’ theories.   
The ‘financial fragility’ theory suggests that liquidity creation decreases after capital support, 
while the ‘risk absorption’ theories predict increases in liquidity creation.  Both effects may be at 
                                                           
9   Dahl and Spivey (1995) and Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) provide more detailed overviews of prompt corrective 
action measures in the U.S.  -9-  
 
play,  which  implies  that  our  tests  will  pick  up  the  net  effect  of  capital  support  on  liquidity 
creation.  Thus, we formulate the following two hypotheses:  
H4a. Capital Support Financial Fragility Hypothesis: Capital support is associated with 
reductions in liquidity creation.   
H4b. Capital  Support  Risk  Absorption  Hypothesis:  Capital  support  is  associated  with 
increases in liquidity creation.   
Note that all of our hypotheses in essence focus on the supply side of banking services.  That 
is, they focus on the responses of banks to regulatory interventions and capital support.  We 
acknowledge here that there may be some demand effects as well.  Capital support is made 
public through  financial statements.    To  some  extent,  regulatory  interventions may  become 
public knowledge as well.
10  When customers become aware of the banks’ distress, they may 
reduce their demand for loans and other banking services (for details see, e.g., Slovin, Sushka, 
and Poloncheck (1993); Cornett and Tehranian (1994); Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2003); 
Watanabe (2007)).  This may cause bank risk taking and liquidity creation to decline.  In this 
paper, we cannot distinguish between demand and supply side effects because we do not have 
information on loan applications or other indicators of demand. 
 
III. Regression framework, data, and variables 
This section first discusses our regression framework.  It then describes the data.  Finally, it 
explains the key independent variables (regulatory interventions and capital support), the key 
dependent variables (changes in risk taking and liquidity creation), and the control variables.  All 
financial variables are expressed in real € 2000 terms using the GDP deflator.   
A.  Regression framework 
To test our hypotheses, we model changes in risk taking and liquidity creation as functions of 
regulatory interventions, capital support, and a set of control variables.  To ensure that our results 
are not driven by small changes in risk taking and liquidity creation, we use ordered logit models 
                                                           
10   An example of a regulatory intervention eventually surfacing in the public domain is the unanticipated turnover 
of an executive. Such information may affect customers’ choices about the banks from which to purchase their 
financial services. 
 -10-  
 
which  distinguish  between  substantial  changes  in  bank  behavior  and  relatively  constant 
behavior.
11 Specifically, in our risk-taking ordered logit models, the dependent variable takes on 
the value of 1 if the bank experienced a drop in risk taking (relative to the previous year) of more 
than 3% (DECR).  It takes on the value 2 if risk taking remained constant within a narrow band of 
+/- 3% (CONST), and it takes on the value 3 if risk taking increased by more than 3% (INCR).  In 
our liquidity-creation ordered logit models, we also use cutoffs of +/- 3%.  In a robustness test, 
we use alternative cutoffs (see Section IV C).    
The general formula for an ordered logit model with three categories expresses the probability 
of observation i of variable Y falling into category j in year t as:  
 ￿￿￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿,  j = 1,2            (1) 
and 
  ￿￿￿ ￿,￿  ￿  1￿ ￿  1  ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿,￿ ￿ 1￿              (2) 
where Xi,t-1 is the vector of independent variables for observation i in year t-1, the α’s are the 
intercepts, and the β’s are the slope coefficients.   
In our model, Yi,t is the change in risk taking or liquidity creation (see Section III D) which 
falls  in  one  of  three  categories  (it  decreases  (DECR),  stays  relatively  constant  (CONST),  or 
increases  (INCR));  Xi,t-1  is  the  vector  of  regulatory  interventions  and  capital  injections  (see 
Section III C), and control variables (see Section III E), all lagged by one period.  Thus, in our 
model, the equations are:  
      ￿￿￿ ￿,￿  ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿           (3)   
       ￿￿￿ ￿,￿  ￿  ￿!"#$￿ ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿ ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿      (4)   
       ￿￿￿ ￿,￿  ￿  &"￿ ￿ ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿            (5) 
The β’s on regulatory interventions or capital support are the coefficients of primary interest.  
In the tables, we will report odds ratios which are the exponentiated β’s, unless stated otherwise. 
                                                           
11   An ordinary least squares approach could be dominated by small changes.   -11-  
 
In  the  risk-taking  (liquidity-creation)  regressions,  an  odds  ratio  of  1  (β  is  0)  for  regulatory 
interventions  or  capital  support  indicates  that  the  probability  of  observing  an  increase  or  a 
decrease in risk taking (liquidity creation) following the action is equally likely. If the odds ratio 
is  above  1  (β  is  positive),  this  implies  that  the  intervention  or  support  results  in  a  higher 
probability of an increase in risk taking (liquidity creation).  Similarly, if the odds ratio is below 1 
(β is negative), this implies that the intervention or support results in a lower probability of an 
increase in risk taking (liquidity creation) (see Section IV).
12 
B.  Data 
We obtain annual data for all the banks that operate in Germany between 1999 and 2009 from 
the Bundesbank.  We exclude banks if they have i) no loans outstanding, ii) zero deposits, iii) 
unused  commitments  that  exceed  4  times  total  assets,  iv)  balance  sheet  items  with  negative 
values, or v) total assets below € 25 million.  Our dataset has 17,662 bank-year observations for 
2,735 banks, of which 234 are private banks, 591 belong to the public banking sector, and 1,910 
institutions are in the cooperative pillar.  In most analyses, we include banking pillar dummies.  
In some analyses, we instead split the sample into large versus small banks (above and below 
median assets). 
During  the  sample  period,  the  banking  sector  experienced  a  consolidation  wave.  
Consequently, we identify merged institutions, and create a new institution after the merger to 
avoid spikes in risk taking and liquidity creation that are attributable to the merger.
13  This causes 
                                                           
12   Note that the ordered logit model makes a ‘parallel odds’ assumption that the slope coefficients β are constant.  In 
the context of our study, this means that interventions and support are assumed to have equiproportionate effects 
on the probabilities of either increases or decreases in risk taking and liquidity creation.  For example, if the 
effect of regulatory interventions is twice the effect of capital support in reducing risk taking (relative to an 
increase or constant risk taking), then it will also have twice the effect in reducing or constant risk taking (relative 
to an increase).  Wald tests (not reported) show that that the ‘parallel odds’ assumption cannot be statistically 
rejected, implying that our use of ordered logit models is valid. 
13   We consider several possible ways to treat mergers: (1) excluding merged banks, (2) merging banks ‘backwards’ 
into one institution over the entire time period, and (3) creating a new institution after the merger.  The first 
option leads to loss of information as a number of mergers took place during the sample period.  Furthermore, a 
bias would be created as a large fraction of the mergers are classified as ‘distressed mergers,’ i.e., dropping these 
banks would also mean dropping a large share of the most troubled institutions.  The second option would be 
based upon the assumption that banks do not change their behavior after consolidation, i.e., they behave as one 
entity prior to the merger and do not change their behavior following the merger.  We choose the third option, 
and create a new institution after two banks merge.  For a detailed description of possible merger treatment 
procedures, see Merkl and Stolz (2006). -12-  
 
the number of banks in our sample to increase as we have three independently-treated banks: the 
two pre-merger banks and the post-merger bank.
14 
C.  Key independent variables: Regulatory interventions and capital support 
We use a dummy variable Regulatory interventions to capture serious disciplinary actions by 
the regulator against banks.  The variable takes on the value one if one or more of the following 
measures was imposed in that year: 
(1) Restructuring orders 
(2) Restrictions or prohibitions of lending activities 
(3) Restrictions or prohibitions of deposit taking  
(4) Restrictions or prohibitions of deposit withdrawals  
(5) Restrictions or prohibitions of profit distributions 
(6) Dismissal of senior executives
15  
We have information on the size of capital injections, and construct a variable Capital Support 
measured as capital injection/Tier 1 capital.  We scale by Tier 1 capital to measure the relative 
importance of the support to the bank.  We use Tier 1 capital rather than total regulatory capital in 
the  denominator  as  the  latter  includes  subordinated  debt,  loan  loss  reserves,  and  other  less 
relevant components. 
Table I contains summary statistics on regulatory interventions and capital support for the full 
sample and for the sample broken down by bank type (private/public sector/cooperative banks) 
and bank size (large/small banks).  In addition, the table also shows a breakdown of banks that 
only recorded regulatory interventions, only received capital support, and received both.  
In  total,  we  record  452  regulatory  interventions.  Due  to  data  confidentiality,  we  cannot 
disclose details of the different types of interventions.  Regulatory authorities intervened in 17% 
of all banks.  Most of these interventions were in cooperative banks (22%).  The dataset contains 
371 cases of capital support, 14% of all banks received capital support. Most of this support is 
                                                           
14   As we show below in Section IV C, results are similar for merged and non-merged banks.  
15   We  include  measures  against  senior  executives  because  these  individuals  determine  the  key  funding  and 
investment decisions of a bank, which have important effects on both risk taking and liquidity creation.  The 
corporate finance literature argues that changing the figurehead is frequently associated with changes in corporate 
policies (e.g., Weisbach (1988)).  Re-running our regressions based on a regulatory intervention dummy that 
excludes the dismissals of senior executives does not materially change our inferences.   -13-  
 
observed in cooperative banks (17%).  The average support is 18% of Tier 1 capital. In the 
sample, 71 banks were subject to both regulatory interventions and capital support.   
 [Table I Summary statistics for regulatory interventions and capital support]  
D.   Dependent variables: Changes in risk taking and liquidity creation 
The dependent variables are the changes in risk taking and liquidity creation.  For ease of 
exposition, however, we discuss these variables below in levels. 
Our measure of risk is the Basel I risk-weighted assets divided by total assets (RWA / TA), 
which has been used in prior research (see, e.g., Logan (2001), Berger and Bouwman (2011)).  
This measure covers credit risk both on and off the balance sheet.  We record a drop in risk (Y = 
DECR) if RWA / TA decreases by more than 3%, an increase in risk (Y = INCR) if RWA / TA 
increases by more than 3%, and constant risk (Y = CONST) otherwise.   
Our liquidity creation measure takes into account all on- and off-balance sheet activities.  We 
calculate the amount of liquidity created by each bank using a slight variation on Berger and 
Bouwman’s (2009) preferred measure and convert it into real € 2000 terms.  The reasons for the 
change and the three-step procedure used to construct this measure are explained in detail in the 
Appendix.  We record a drop in liquidity creation (Y = DECR) if liquidity creation decreases by 
more than 3%, an increase in liquidity creation (Y = INCR) if liquidity creation increases by more 
than 3%, and constant liquidity creation (Y = CONST) otherwise. 
E.   Control variables   
All of the control variables (except for dummy variables) are measured in changes.  For ease 
of exposition, we discuss these variables below in levels.  We also indicate how we expect them 
to correlate with risk taking and liquidity creation. 
Total assets (natural log) is included to account for bank size.  We expect size to be positively 
correlated  with  risk  taking  because  large  banks  have  a  greater  capacity  to  absorb  risk,  and 
because in some cases, the largest institutions may be considered to be too-important-to-fail.  
Size is also expected to be positively correlated with liquidity creation (see Berger and Bouwman 
(2009)).  Return on equity controls for profitability.  Profitable banks may be less keen to take on 
risks (Laeven and Levine (2009)).  The effect of profitability on liquidity creation is not clear ex 
ante.    We  control  for  loan  portfolio  concentration  using  a  Herfindahl-Hirschman  index  of -14-  
 
lending activities across 8 industry sectors.
16  While banks with more concentrated loan portfolios 
are  riskier  (all  else  equal),  they  may  choose  assets  with  higher  or  lower  risk  weights.    The 
expected effect of loan  portfolio concentration  on liquidity creation is  also ambiguous.  The 
number of Bank branches is included because more branches offer more opportunities to make 
loans  as  well  as  potentially  better  monitoring  of  these  loans.    The  effect  on  risk  taking  is 
ambiguous because of the greater lending but potentially lower risk per loan.  More branches 
offer  more  business  opportunities  for  providing  loans  and  deposits  to  customers  and  may 
therefore  result  in  greater  liquidity  creation.    To  account  for  the  economic  environment,  we 
include  the  Interest  rate  spread,  measured  as  the  difference  between  10-year  and  1-year 
government bonds.  When the interest rate spread is wide, banks have an incentive to provide 
more loans, which may lead to increased risk taking and higher liquidity creation.  Finally, we 
also include the dummy variables Public bank and Cooperative bank that provide information on 
bank types.  We omit the dummy for Private banks to avoid perfect collinearity.   
Table II contains summary statistics for the dependent variables and the control variables.  
While the regressions are run in changes, we report levels and changes for all the variables.  
Panel A presents the statistics for the full sample, and Panels B and C show a detailed breakdown 
for the banks that experienced regulatory interventions and received capital support, respectively.   
[Table II Summary statistics for dependent variables and control variables] 
 
IV.  How do risk taking and liquidity creation respond to regulatory interventions 
and capital support? 
This section tests our hypotheses on how regulatory interventions and capital support affect 
bank risk taking and liquidity creation.  We first present the main results.  We then show the 
results for subsamples by banking pillar, size, capitalization, and subperiods.  Next, we perform 
robustness checks in which we use alternative cutoffs, run regressions for subsamples of merged 
and non-merged banks, use alternative measures of risk taking and liquidity creation, and employ 
ordered  probit  (instead  of  ordered  logit)  models.    Finally,  we  discuss  the  robustness  of  our 
inferences to using instrumental variable regressions.   
                                                           
16   The  8  industry  sectors  are  i)  agriculture,  forestry  and  fishing;  ii)  utilities  and  mining;  iii)  construction;  iv) 
manufacturing; v) trade; vi) transportation; vii) financial services; and viii) other services.  -15-  
 
A.  Main results: The effects of regulatory interventions and capital support on bank risk 
taking and liquidity creation 
Table III shows the main results.  Panels A and B use changes in risk (∆RWA / TA) and 
changes in liquidity creation (∆ LC) as the dependent variables, respectively.  
Panel A shows that regulatory interventions are associated with decreases in risk, consistent 
with the Regulatory Intervention Risk Reduction Hypothesis (H1).  The odds ratio of 0.7819 is 
statistically significantly different from one.  It implies that an intervention is associated with a 
21.81% increase in the likelihood of a drop in risk, which is also economically significant.
17  The 
odds  ratio  on  capital  support,  0.9818,  is  also  statistically  significant.    However,  it  is  not 
economically significant.  It implies that a mean capital support of 18% of Tier 1 capital (see 
Table I Panel A) is associated with only a 0.33% increase in the likelihood of a drop in risk.
18  
This finding suggests that the effects of the Capital Support Risk Reduction Hypothesis (H2a) 
and the Capital Support Risk Increase Hypothesis (H2b) are either weak or approximately offset 
each other, and that capital support is not associated with a substantial change in risk taking, at 
least not in the short run. 
[Table III Main regression results] 
Panel  B  reveals  that  regulatory  interventions  are  associated  with  decreases  in  liquidity 
creation, consistent with the Regulatory Discipline Hypothesis (H3).  The odds ratio of 0.6398 is 
statistically significantly different from one and suggests that an intervention is associated with a 
36.02%  increase  in  the  likelihood  of  a  drop  in  liquidity  creation.  This  finding  is  also 
economically significant, suggesting that sanctions by the regulator have non-negligible effects 
on the scope and scale of bank activities. The odds ratio on capital support, 0.9839, is again 
statistically significant, but not economically insignificant.  A mean capital support of 18% is 
associated with only a 0.29% increase in the likelihood of a drop in liquidity creation.  This 
suggests that the effects of the Capital Support Financial Fragility Hypothesis (H4a) and the 
Capital Support Risk Absorption Hypothesis (H4b) are weak or approximately net each other out, 
and that capital support is not associated with a major change in liquidity creation in the short 
run. 
                                                           
17   The percentage change in odds per one-unit change is (e
β – 1) * 100, where e
β is the odds ratio and β is the 
regression coefficient. 
18   The percentage change in odds per mean capital support is (e
β * mean capital support – 1) * 100, where e
β is the odds 
ratio and β is the regression coefficient. -16-  
 
The control variables in Panels A and B generally have the expected effects and tend to be 
statistically significant.  Increases in bank size, the number of bank branches, and the interest rate 
spread  are  associated  with  increases  in  risk  taking  and  liquidity  creation.    Increases  in 
profitability are associated with a small reduction in risk, and have no effect on liquidity creation.  
Changes  in  loan  portfolio  concentration  do  not  have  a  significant  effect  on  risk  or  liquidity 
creation.  Finally, public and cooperative banks are relatively more likely to experience increases 
in risk taking and liquidity creation than private banks. 
B.  Results for subsamples by banking pillar, size, capitalization, and subperiods 
In this subsection, we examine whether the main results hold for subsamples by banking pillar, 
size, capitalization, and crisis versus non-crisis subperiods.  Table IV contains the results.  For 
brevity, we only report the odds ratios on the main variables of interest, regulatory interventions 
and capital support. All regressions, however, include the full set of control variables.   
[Table IV Regression results for banks split by banking pillar, size, capitalization, and 
subperiods] 
First,  since  our  discussion  above  revealed  various  differences  among  banks  in  the  three 
banking pillars, we investigate whether the main results hold for all three types.   As shown in 
Panel  I-A,  the  effect  of  regulatory  interventions  on  risk  taking  are  only  statistically  and 
economically significant for cooperative banks.  For these banks, the odds ratio of 0.7470 implies 
that an intervention is associated with a 25.30% increase in the likelihood of a drop in risk.  This 
finding is not surprising, given that the vast majority of regulatory interventions took place in 
cooperative  banks.  The  odds  ratios  on  capital  support  are  close  to  one  for  all  three  pillars, 
showing a lack of economic significance, as in the full sample.  Turning to the liquidity creation 
results  in  Panel  I-B,  regulatory  interventions  are  found  to  be  statistically  and  economically 
significant  in  reducing  liquidity  creation  in  both  the  public  and  cooperative  banking  pillars.  
Since public and cooperative banks are on average also smaller than private banks, have less 
flexible  business  models  in  terms  of  scope  and  scale  of  activities,  and  tend  to  operate  in 
geographically delimited areas, they may find it harder to adapt to regulatory sanctions than their 
more flexible counterparts from the private banking sector. The effects of capital support are 
again economically insignificant across the three subsamples.   -17-  
 
Next,  recognizing  that  banks  of  different  size  classes  have  different  balance  sheet 
compositions (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005)), we examine whether regulatory 
interventions and capital support have different effects for banks of different size classes.  We 
split our sample into small and large banks using the median bank size (€ 329 million) as the 
cutoff.  We find in Panel II-A that the effects of regulatory interventions on risk taking appear to 
occur  primarily  in  small  banks,  possibly  because  large banks  may  have  more  countervailing 
power relative to regulators and in some  cases  may be too-important-to-fail.   The  effects of 
regulatory  interventions  on  liquidity  creation  in  Panel II-B  are  statistically  and  economically 
significant for both size classes.  While there is no statistically significant effect of capital support 
on  liquidity  creation  for  small  banks,  we  again  uncover  a  significant  but  no  economically 
significant effect of capital support for large banks.   
 One may expect that regulatory interventions and capital support have stronger effects on risk 
taking and liquidity creation when banks are poorly capitalized (e.g., Dahl and Spivey (1995); 
Aggarwal and Jacques (2001)).  To examine this idea, we split the sample into poorly- and better-
capitalized banks.  As cutoffs, we use the median bank’s equity capital ratio (8.73%).  Panels III-
A and III-B show the results.  As expected, the effects of regulatory interventions on bank risk 
taking and liquidity creation are stronger for the poorly-capitalized institutions. Capital support 
again results in statistically but not economically significant changes in risk taking and liquidity 
creation.  
Financial crises raise the question of how effectively banks can be disciplined in episodes of 
extraordinary distress and what the impact is of capital support during such times (Berrospide and 
Edge (2010); Giannetti and Simonov (2010)).  From a policy perspective, it is therefore important 
to ascertain whether the effects of regulatory interventions and capital support differ for crisis and 
non-crisis periods.  We classify the years 2001 and 2007-2009 in our sample as crisis years, and 
the remaining years 1999-2000 and 2002-2006 as non-crisis years.  The year 2001 is considered a 
crisis year because the terrorist attacks on September 11 in the U.S. and the bursting of the 
dot.com bubble both depressed financial markets.
19  The subprime lending crisis that emerged in 
2007 gave rise to major difficulties in financial markets with interbank markets seizing up due to 
banks’ reluctance to roll over debt, reflecting concerns about the soundness of other banks and 
                                                           
19  The high growth segment of the German stock market collapsed.  As a result, the Deutsche Börse (the German 
stock market operator) stopped providing information about high growth stocks on neuermarkt.com at the end of 
2001, and subsequently abolished the entire market segment.   -18-  
 
their  exposure  to  structured  products  containing  subprime  mortgages.    During  that  period, 
numerous  banks  such  as  Industriekreditbank,  Bayerische  Landesbank,  and  SachsenLB  in 
Germany and Countrywide and Bear Stearns in the U.S. had to be bailed out or collapsed (e.g., 
Berger and Bouwman (2010)).   
In Panels IV-A and IV-B, we find that risk taking only responds to regulatory interventions 
during  non-crisis  years.  This  result  may  be  attributable  to  the  too-many-to-fail  phenomenon 
which predicts that closure of a bank by the regulator is rendered unlikely when the number of 
distressed banks is large, because the closure option is unattractive for the regulator and bailouts 
are  the  preferred  option  (Acharya  and  Yorulmazer  (2008);  Brown  and  Dinc  (forthcoming)).  
Expecting a bailout, banks may not adjust their risk taking.  This problem may be amplified by 
the observation that during crisis periods, ailing banks evergreen their loans to avoid further 
write-downs (Peek and Rosengren (2005)).  In contrast, liquidity creation reacts statistically and 
economically significantly to regulatory interventions during both subperiods.     The effects of 
capital support measures remain economically ineffectual during both subperiods.  
To summarize the findings for the subsamples in Table IV, regulatory interventions result in 
reduced risk taking in only some of the subsamples – cooperative banks, small banks, poorly-
capitalized  banks,  and  banks  during  non-crisis  years.    However,  these  interventions  tend  to 
reduce liquidity creation for almost all subsamples (private banks being the lone exception).  For 
most of the subsamples (as for the full sample), capital support generally has a statistically but no 
economically significant effect on either risk taking or liquidity creation. 
C.    Robustness tests  
In this subsection, we perform several additional robustness checks.  First, we use alternative 
cutoffs for the dependent variables to check whether our results are sensitive to our choice of 3% 
cutoffs.  Second, we perform tests for subsamples that only contain merged and non-merged 
banks, respectively.  Third, we use alternative measures of risk taking and liquidity creation.  
Finally, we reestimate all our risk taking and liquidity creation regressions using probit analysis 
to verify our results are insensitive to the choice of modeling technique.   
Table V contains most of the results.  As before, we only report the odds ratios on the main 
variables of interest, regulatory interventions and capital support, for brevity.  All regressions do, 
however, include the vector of control variables discussed above. -19-  
 
[Table V Robustness] 
Our first check examines whether our results are sensitive to the choice of 3% cutoffs.  We 
show robustness tests with alternative cutoffs for the two dependent variables using 1 and 5% 
changes.  We find that for both alternative cutoffs, regulatory interventions reduce risk taking and 
liquidity  creation  (statistically  and  economically  significant),  and  that  capital  support  has 
economically insignificant effects on both risk taking and liquidity creation (see Panels A I and B 
I).  Thus, our main regression results are robust to these alternative cutoffs. 
Our  second  check  reestimates  our  regressions  for  subsamples  of  merged  and  non-merged 
banks,  respectively.  As  shown  in  Panels  A  II  and  B  II,  our  findings  remain  qualitatively 
unchanged, although the significance declines for regulatory interventions from 1% in the main 
regressions to the 10% level.   
Our third check examines whether our results are robust to using alternative measures of risk 
taking and liquidity creation.  Consider risk taking first.  Panel A III shows the results using an 
alternative measure of risk taking – the Tier 1 equity capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (Tier 1 / 
RWA).  This is an inverse risk measure in that higher values imply less risk.  This variable 
captures the extent to which the regulatory interventions and capital support affect the banks’ 
regulatory capital ratios.  To avoid confusion, we record a 1 if the ratio increased by more than 
3% (i.e., risk dropped) and a 3 if the ratio decreased by more than 3% (i.e., risk went up).  As 
shown, our \ results are robust to using this alternative risk measure.  Regulatory interventions 
have a statistically and economically significant effect in lowering risk taking (i.e., in increasing 
Tier 1 / RWA), and capital support has a statistically but not economically significant effect – 
both findings are consistent with our main results. 
Consider liquidity creation next.  A change in liquidity creation may be due to a change in 
assets, a change in liabilities, a change in off-balance sheet activities, or some combination of 
these.  We decompose our aggregate liquidity creation measure into three components – assets, 
liabilities, and off-balance sheet activities – to determine which are most affected by regulatory 
interventions and capital support.  Panel B III shows that regulatory interventions and capital 
support  reduce  asset-based  and  off-balance  sheet-based  liquidity  creation,  but  have  no 
measurable  effect  on  liability-based  liquidity  creation.    These  effects  are  also  economically 
significant for regulatory interventions but not for capital support.       -20-  
 
Finally, we reestimate all regressions reported in Tables III, IV, and V using ordered probit 
models, and obtain qualitatively similar results (not reported).  This suggests that our results are 
not  driven  by  the  modeling  technique  chosen.    We  prefer  to  present  our  main  results  using 
ordered logit models because the odds ratio has a natural interpretation. 
D.   Instrumental variable regressions 
Our  results  so  far  show  statistically  and  economically  significant  associations  between 
regulatory interventions and reductions in risk taking and liquidity creation, but the effect of 
capital support on these bank behaviors is only statistically significant.  However, there is a 
potential  endogeneity  concern.    Specifically,  bank  distress  may  result  in  both  regulatory 
interventions and capital support on the one hand, and reductions in risk taking and liquidity 
creation on the other hand.  To address this potential endogeneity concern in our main analysis, 
we used lagged interventions and capital support.  Recognizing that this may not be sufficient, we 
now turn to an instrumental variable (IV) approach. 
Since we are not aware of an IV approach using ordered logit models, we instead use IV 
ordered probit estimators.
20   We estimate two systems of equations: one system for the effects of 
regulatory interventions and capital support on risk taking, and a separate system for the effects 
of these actions on liquidity creation.  We estimate systems of equations to take into account the 
correlations between the error terms of the first- and second-stage equations.   
Below,  we  first  discuss  the  instruments  and  then  explain  the  first-  and  second-stage 
regressions.  We use several instruments for our two potentially endogenous variables, regulatory 
interventions  and  capital  support.    Some  of  the  instruments  are  used  in  both  first-stage 
regressions while others are only used in the capital support equation.  We first describe the 
instruments that are used in both.  
Our first instrument exploits variation in the share of Capital support at the county level.  This 
instrument measures capital support in small geographical areas, and captures information about 
the soundness of regionally-delimited banking markets.  Building on the too-many-to-fail effect 
identified by Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008), we argue that distressed banks are more likely to 
receive  an  intervention  or  be  bailed  out  if  other  local  banks  are  weak.    Thus,  regulatory 
                                                           
20   Since all results presented above hold using ordered logit and ordered probit models (see the last robustness 
check in Section III C), the use of IV ordered probit should not materially affect our results. -21-  
 
interventions  and  capital  support  may  be  more  likely  to  take  place if  capital  support  in  that 
market is prevalent.   
We exploit data on the occurrence of special audits, captured by the variable Special audit 
dummy  as  our  second  instrument.    Special  audits  take  place  infrequently  and  mainly  assess 
banks’ loan portfolios, and compliance with capital, liquidity and risk management standards.  
They  not  only  facilitate  information  production,  but  also  improve  supervisory discipline  that 
provides  the foundation  for regulatory  interventions  (DeYoung,  Flannery,  Lang,  and  Sorescu 
(2001)), and possibly  capital  injections.    We  expect that  regulatory  interventions  and  capital 
support are more likely if banks were subjected to a special audit in the previous year.   
In addition, we use the levels of bank risk, captured by the Capital adequacy ratio (Tier 1 
capital  /  RWA),  Loan  loss  provisions/Customer  loans,  and  Risk  (RWA/TA).    Regulatory 
interventions  and  capital  support  take  place  when  bank  risk  taking  is  deemed  too  high.  
Consequently, the two types of actions are directly related to risk levels.  Note, however, that risk 
levels and our dependent variables that capture changes in risk taking are not directly related. 
We now describe the additional instruments that are only used in the capital support first-stage 
regression. 
Since recent research offers suggestive evidence for a politicization of the bank resolution 
process (Brown and Dinc (2005); Imai (2009)), we exploit variation in local voter behavior to 
shed light on whether the composition of the local political landscape affects the way bankers 
associations deal with distressed institutions in their geographic area.
21  Specifically, we include 
the  Shares  of  conservative,  liberal,  and  green  party  voters  per  county  (shares  of the  social 
democratic  party  are  excluded  to  avoid  collinearity)  as  instruments  for  capital  support.    We 
expect a reduced propensity to observe capital support in banks that are located in counties with 
more  conservative,  liberal,  and  green  party  voters,  reflecting  their  stronger  belief  in  market 
forces.
22   
                                                           
21   A growing body of literature examines the politicization of the bank resolution process.  Brown and Dinc (2005) 
report  evidence that distressed  banks  are less likely  to  be  bailed  out or  have their  charter  revoked  prior to 
elections than after elections in emerging market economies.  They conclude that bank resolutions are affected by 
political considerations.  Imai (2009) shows that bank regulators exhibit a propensity of delaying declarations of 
insolvency in regions that support senior politicians of the ruling party in Japan.   
22   In stark contrast to the U.S., where liberals and conservatives are opposite extremes, in Germany both liberals 
and conservatives strongly believe in market forces.  -22-  
 
Finally,  we  include  Bankers  Association  Dummies  for  membership  in  regional  bankers 
associations. In total, 32 such dummy variables enter our equation. In doing so, we account for 
potential  differences  in  the  propensities  and  willingness  of  these  individual  associations  to 
provide capital support (Dam and Koetter (2011)).   
 Our  instruments  satisfy  the  criteria  of  relevance  and  exogeneity.    We  argue  they  are  all 
relevant because they affect the two potentially endogenous variables, but there are no reasons to 
believe that capital support at the county level, special audits, the levels of risk, voters’ shares, or 
bankers association membership directly affect changes in bank risk taking or liquidity creation.   
As mentioned above, we estimate two systems of equations.  For ease of exposition, we use 
the terms “first-stage” and “second-stage” regressions in our discussion below, but emphasize 
that both are jointly estimated.  
We run two first-stage regressions: a probit regression in which the probability of a regulatory 
intervention is regressed on capital support at the county level, the special audit dummy, the risk 
measures, and all of the control variables from our main analysis; and an OLS regression in 
which capital support (Capital injection / Tier 1 capital) is regressed on the instruments and 
control  variables  included  in  the  regulatory  intervention  regression,  plus  the  shares  of 
conservative / liberal / green voters, and bankers association dummies.   
In the second stage, we run ordered probit regressions of the change in risk and liquidity 
creation  on  the  predicted  values  of  the  two  potentially  endogenous  variables  –  regulatory 
interventions and capital support – and all the control variables.   
Table VI presents the instrumental variable regression results.  We report coefficients because 
exponentiated probit coefficients cannot be interpreted as odds ratios as in logit models.  The 
results show that most of the instruments have the predicted effect on regulatory interventions 
and  capital  support,  although  some  of  them  are  not  significant.    F-tests  indicate  the  joint 
significance of our dummies for the bankers associations.  Importantly, we find that – consistent 
with the results above – regulatory interventions and capital support are statistically significant in 
reducing risk taking and liquidity creation.       
[Table VI Instrumental variable regressions] 
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V.  Long-run effects of regulatory interventions and capital support 
Our results so far suggest that regulatory interventions are associated with statistically and 
economically significant reductions in risk taking and declines in liquidity creation, while capital 
support  only  has  statistically,  but  generally  not  economically  significant  effects.    All  these 
analyses focus on the short-run effects, i.e., they examine the impact on risk taking and liquidity 
creation the year after a regulatory intervention or capital support.  In our final analysis, we focus 
on  the  long-run  effects,  where  the  long  run  is  defined  as  five  years  after  the  regulatory 
intervention or capital support.   
To do so, we examine the long-run impact of regulatory interventions and capital support on 
risk taking relative to the industry and on banks’ liquidity creation market share. We do not use 
regression analysis because the use of five-year lags of all the regression variables would result in 
a substantial loss of observations.  Instead, we track the evolution of the percentile ranks of the 
banks that were subject to regulatory interventions and received capital support over a five year 
period.  The use of percentile ranks controls for industry trends in both measures to take out the 
effects of any long-run secular trends.  To illustrate, suppose risk taking and liquidity creation 
increase by 2% over the five years after a regulatory intervention, while the industry’s risk taking 
and liquidity creation go up by 10%.  If we did not control for the industry change, we would 
incorrectly conclude that the long-run effects of the regulatory interventions were positive on risk 
taking and liquidity creation.  By focusing on risk taking relative to the industry and liquidity 
creation market shares, we correctly conclude that the long-run effects are negative. 
Risk taking is measured as the percentile rank of a bank’s RWA / TA relative to that of the 
entire banking sector.  Liquidity creation market share is defined as liquidity created by a bank 
relative to liquidity created by the entire banking sector.  To account for the fact that a bank’s 
liquidity creation market share is negative if it destroys liquidity, we focus on the percentile rank 
of each bank’s market share instead of its market share per se.   
The long-run effects are shown in Table VII for the full sample and for banks split by size.  
The results in Panel A suggest that over the five years after regulatory interventions, bank risk 
taking decreases for all banks and for the subsamples of small and large banks.  As shown in 
Panel  B,  regulatory  interventions  are  associated  with  long-run  declines  in  liquidity  creation -24-  
 
market share for all banks and for the subsamples of small and large banks.
23  Our results indicate 
that regulatory interventions have a lasting effect on risk taking and liquidity creation – both are 
lower even five years after the intervention.  Thus, the Regulatory Intervention Risk Reduction 
Hypothesis and the Regulatory Discipline Hypothesis are supported by the long-run data as well 
as the short-run data.   
[Table VII Long-run effects] 
Turning to the effects of capital support, the data suggest that five years after such support, 
both risk taking and liquidity creation are lower for all banks and for the subsamples of small and 
large banks.  While capital support has no economically significant effect on risk taking and 
liquidity creation in the short run (as shown above), both risk taking and liquidity creation are 
significantly reduced in the long run.  These long-run results support the empirical dominance of 
the  Capital  Support  Risk  Reduction  Hypothesis  over  the  Capital  Support  Risk  Increase 
Hypothesis, as well as the dominance of the Capital Support Financial Fragility Hypothesis over 
the Capital Support Risk Absorption Hypothesis. 
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we formulate hypotheses regarding the effects of regulatory interventions and 
capital support on bank risk taking and liquidity creation, and test these using a unique dataset.  
Since the reduction of bank risk taking is a primary goal of these actions, and the creation of 
liquidity by banks is essential for the macroeconomy, these issues are of first-order importance 
for academics, bank regulators, and policymakers.   
We  find  that  regulatory  interventions  are  generally  associated  with  statistically  and 
economically significant reductions in both risk taking and liquidity creation in the short run and 
long run.  The reductions in risk taking are consistent with intentions and support the Regulatory 
Intervention  Risk  Reduction  Hypothesis.    The  reductions  in  liquidity  creation  may  be 
unintentional and support the Regulatory Discipline Hypothesis. 
                                                           
23   The difference in the number of observations is due to the fact that our main risk measure is available for fewer 
banks than our main liquidity creation measure.   -25-  
 
We also find that capital support is associated with statistically significant reductions in both 
risk  taking  and  liquidity  creation  in  the  short  run  and  long  run,  but  the  effects  are  only 
economically significant in the long run.  The risk-taking results suggest that in the short run, the 
Capital Support Risk Reduction Hypothesis and the Capital Support Risk Increase Hypothesis are 
weak  or  approximately  offset  each  other,  while  in  the  long  run,  the  Capital  Support  Risk 
Reduction Hypothesis empirically dominates.  Similarly, the liquidity creation results suggest that 
in the short run, the Capital Support Financial Fragility Hypothesis and the Capital Support Risk 
Absorption Hypothesis are weak or approximately net each other out, while in the long run, the 
Capital Support Financial Fragility Hypothesis empirically dominates. 
In terms of policy implications, the results suggest that regulatory interventions and capital 
support have intended and unintended consequences.  Policy makers should be aware that while 
these policies may be effective in reducing bank risk taking, they may have adverse effects on the 
macroeconomy through reductions in bank liquidity creation.   We conclude by pointing out that 
our research naturally  gives rise to several critically important questions that are beyond the 
scope of our study.  At which point in time should regulators intervene in ailing institutions? 
What is the optimal level of bank liquidity creation?   Do capital support measures distort the 
competitive landscape in banking?  We leave these questions to future research.   -26-  
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Appendix: Bank liquidity creation 
This Appendix explains how we measure liquidity creation and shows how liquidity creation 
changed over our sample period. 
A.  Measuring bank liquidity creation 
We calculate a bank’s € amount of liquidity creation using a slight variation on Berger and 
Bouwman’s (2009) three-step procedure, which is discussed below and illustrated in Table A-1.   
In the first step, we classify bank assets, liabilities, and equity as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid 
based on the ease, cost, and time it takes for customers to withdraw liquid funds from the bank, 
and the ease, cost and time it takes for a bank to dispose of their obligations to meet these 
liquidity demands.  We follow a similar principle for off-balance sheet items. 
A key difference between our calculation of liquidity creation and the approach in Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) exists.  They argue that all activities should be classified based on information 
on both product category and maturity.  However, due to data limitations, Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) have to classify loans according to either category or maturity.  The unique database from 
the Bundesbank, however, enables us to exploit information on both loan category and maturity 
when classifying these items.
24  
In the second step, we assign weights of either +½, 0, or -½ to all bank activities that are 
classified in the previous step.  The signs of the weights are consistent with liquidity creation 
theory, which states that liquidity is created when banks transform illiquid assets into liquid 
liabilities.  Liquidity is destroyed when liquid assets are financed by illiquid liabilities or equity.  
Hence, we allocate positive weights to illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, while negative weights 
are applied to liquid assets and illiquid liabilities and equity.  We use weights of +½ and -½ 
because liquidity creation is only half determined by the source or use of funds alone.  We apply 
the intermediate weight of 0 to semi-liquid assets and liabilities, based on the assumption that 
semi-liquid activities fall halfway between liquid and illiquid activities.  In terms of off-balance 
                                                           
24  Another difference is that Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) preferred measure includes the gross fair values of off-
balance sheet derivatives.  Since only notional amounts are available in the Bundesbank database and since 
derivatives affect liquidity creation only marginally in the U.S., we assume that this holds in Germany as well 
and exclude derivatives from our measure of liquidity creation.  This exclusion should not have a large effect 
since most banks operate with close to matched books. -31-  
 
sheet items, we follow Berger and Bouwman (2009) and apply positive weights to all illiquid 
guarantees.   
In the third step, we combine the activities as classified and weighted in the first two steps to 
obtain two liquidity creation measures.  ‘Mat Cat Fat’ represents our classification of activities 
based on both maturity and category with the inclusion of off-balance sheet activities.  ’Mat Cat 
Nonfat’ excludes off-balance sheet activities.  The calculation of both measures is illustrated in 
Table A-1. 
B.  Bank liquidity creation from 1999 to 2009 
We  briefly  explore  how  liquidity  creation  has  evolved  from  1999  to  2009  and  further 
investigate how it varies across different types of banks (see Figure A-1).  Assessing liquidity 
creation by ‘Mat Cat Fat’ (our preferred measure) and ‘Mat Cat Nonfat’ reveals similar trends 
over time.  However, the level of liquidity created by banks doubles when we include off-balance 
sheet activities, a finding that is similar to the U.S.  Since banks create a substantial amount of 
liquidity off the balance sheet we focus on ‘Mat Cat Fat’ in the rest of the paper.   
[Fig.  1 Liquidity creation: Mat Cat Nonfat and Mat Cat Fat]  
Based  on  our  preferred  measure  ‘Mat  Cat  Fat,’  we  find  that  liquidity  creation  increased 
sharply at the beginning of the period before it peaked in 2001 and began to decline steadily 
thereafter.  Liquidity creation rose again from 2004 onwards whereby it reached the highest level 
of approximately € 1.5 trillion in 2006.  The financial crisis that began in 2007 coincided with a 
massive plunge in liquidity creation.  The level of aggregate liquidity creation at the end of the 
period is lower than at the beginning of our sample period.  Banks created around € 1.014 trillion 
of liquidity in 1999, compared with € 1.250 trillion in 2009.  An examination of the median 
bank’s  liquidity  creation  in  Table  A-2,  however,  suggests  that  the  median  bank’s  liquidity 
creation increased from € 42 million in 1999 to € 102 million in 2009, we obtain a similar picture 
when  we  investigate  liquidity  creation  divided  by  total  assets  (increases  from  21%  to  over 
28%).
25  
[Table A-2 Liquidity Creation in Germany]  
                                                           
25   The increase in liquidity creation for the median bank is due to the fact that banks grew considerably during the 
sampling period.  This growth is, at least partially, due to extensive merger activities in the banking sector.   -32-  
 
Table A-1 
Classification of bank activities and construction of two liquidity creation measures 
Step 1: Classify all bank activities as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid based on product category (Cat) and maturity (Mat).   
 
Step 2: Assign weights to the activities classified in Step 1. 
ASSETS: 
Illiquid assets (weight = ½)    Semi-liquid assets (weight = 0)    Liquid assets (weight = - ½) 
Cat  Mat               Cat   Mat     
Loans to credit institutions  > 1 year             Loans to credit institutions   <= 1 year             Cash and due from other institutions 
Loans to customers    > 1 year             Loans to customers    <= 1 year             Loans to credit institutions (due daily) 
Premises                     Exchange  listed fixed income securities 
Intangible assets                     Exchange  listed equities and other non fixed income securities 
Non exchange  listed fixed income securities                     Exchange  listed participation rights 
Non exchange listed equities and other non fixed income securities                   Exchange  listed investments  in unconsolidated  subsidiaries 
Non exchange  listed investments in  unconsolidated subsidiaries             
Non exchange  listed participation rights           
Subordinated loans to customers             
Subordinated loans to credit institutions             
Other subordinated assets               
Other real estate owned 
LIABILITIES PLUS EQUITY: 
Liquid liabilities (weight = ½)      Semi-liquid liabilities (weight = 0)    Illiquid liabilities (weight = - ½) 
Liabilities to credit institutions (overnight funds)               Cat   Mat              Cat                                                               Mat 
Other liabilities to customers (transactions deposits)               Savings deposits   All maturities            Liabilities to credit institutions                   >1 year 
               Time deposits   All maturities            Other tradable liabilities                                  >1 year 
               Liabilities to credit institutions  <= 1 year             Bank's liability on bankers acceptances 
               Other tradable liabilities  <= 1 year             Subordinated debt 
                     Equity 
OFF-BALANCE SHEET ACTIVITIES: 
Illiquid guarantees (weight = ½)           
Commercial and similar letters of credit             
Unused irrevocable loan commitments             
Unused revocable commitments             
Net standby letters of credit             
All other off-balance sheet liabilities             
 
Step 3: Combine bank activities as classified in Step 1 and as weighted in Step 2 to construct "Mat Cat Fat" and "Mat Cat Nonfat" liquidity creation measures. 
Mat Cat Fat =              
+ ½*illiquid assets + ½*liquid assets + ½*illiquid guarantees    + 0* semi-liquid assets + 0* semi-liquid liabilities   - ½* liquid assets - ½* illiquid liabilities - ½* equity 
Mat Cat Nonfat  =             
+ ½*illiquid assets + ½*liquid assets    + 0* semi-liquid assets + 0* semi-liquid liabilities   - ½* liquid assets - ½* illiquid liabilities - ½* equity -33-  
 
Table A-2 
Liquidity creation in Germany 
Panel A presents the levels of liquidity creation in million € for the median bank, and the level of liquidity creation per € of total assets based on the preferred measure of liquidity creation (Mat 
Cat Fat) at the beginning (1999) and at the end (2009) of our sample period for the full sample and for the subsamples of private, public, and cooperative banks.  We also show a breakdown by 
bank size, whereby we use the median bank size (€ 329 m) as the cutoff.  In Panel B, we report the same figures when off-balance sheet items are excluded using the alternative measure of 
liquidity creation (Mat Cat Nonfat).   
 
   Liquidity creation in 1999  Liquidity creation in 2009 
   Number of banks  Median LC in million €  LC/TA  Number of banks  Median LC in million €  LC/TA 
Panel A: Mat Cat Fat  All banks  2,735  42.23  0.21  1,736  102.28  0.28 
  Private banks  234  39.14  0.12  170  50.21  0.15 
  Public banks  591  190.56  0.21  441  408.10  0.31 
  Cooperative banks  1,910  29.65    0.21  1,125  69.78  0.28 
  Small banks  1,658  21.18  0.21  767  34.84    0.26 
  Large banks  1,077  164.52    0.22  969  274.27  0.30 
 Panel B: Mat Cat Nonfat  All banks  2,735  33.81  0.18  1,736  84.79  0.24 
  Private banks  234  14.98  0.06  170  28.51  0.75 
  Public banks  591  152.99  0.18  441  349.61     0.28 
  Cooperative banks  1,910  24.72  0.18  1,125  58.74   0.24 
  Small banks  1,658  17.93  0.17  767  29.46  0.22 
  Large banks  1,077  128.51  0.18  969  230.32  0.26 
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Figure A-1  
Liquidity creation over time 
This Figure shows how liquidity creation changed from 1999 – 2009.  The left panel presents liquidity creation (measured using the Mat Cat Fat and the Mat Cat Nonfat measures) of all universal 
banks.  The middle panel shows liquidity creation (Mat Cat Fat only) of the three banking pillars: public banks, private banks, and cooperative banks.  The right panel presents liquidity creation 















































1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Large banks
Small banks
Small vs. large banks (Mat Cat Fat only)
 
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank's prudential data base (BAKIS).                    
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Table I 
Summary statistics for regulatory interventions and capital support  
This table provides the number and proportion of banks with regulatory interventions and capital support, and includes the mean and standard deviation of capital support for banks that received 
capital injections.  We also show the descriptive statistics for banks that observed both regulatory interventions and capital support.  Regulatory interventions is a dummy that takes on the value one if 
the supervisory authority intervened in a bank and zero otherwise.  Interventions include: restructuring orders, restrictions or prohibitions of lending activities, deposit taking, deposit withdrawals, or 
profit distributions; and dismissal of senior executives.  Capital support is the amount of capital injected scaled by Tier 1 equity capital.  Panel A provides these statistics for the full sample.  Panel B 
offers a breakdown by banking pillar into private, public, and cooperative banks.  Panel C shows a breakdown by bank size into small and large banks (below and above median total assets (€ 329 
million, respectively).   
 
    Regulatory interventions  Capital support (Capital injection/Tier 1 capital)   Regulatory interventions and capital support 




Number of banks 
that only have 
interventions 
Number of banks 
with capital 
support 
Number of banks 




S.D.  of 
capital 
support 
Number of banks that had 




S.D.  of 
capital 
support 
Panel A: Full sample                   
All banks  2,735  452  381  371  300  0.18  0.11  71  0.22  0.09 
(Proportion)  (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.03) 
                   
Panel B: Breakdown by banking pillar                   
Private banks  234  16  14  26  24  0.19  0.11  2  0.14  0.19 
(Proportion)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.01) 
                   
Public banks  591  24  22  24  22  0.13  0.11  2  0.27  0.00 
(Proportion)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
                   
Cooperative banks  1,910  412  345  321  254  0.18  0.11  67  0.22  0.08 
(Proportion)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.13)  (0.04) 
                   
Panel C: Breakdown by size                   
Small banks  1,658  256  227  170  141  0.19  0.10  29  0.23  0.08 
(Proportion)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.02) 
                   
Large banks  1,077  196  154  201  159  0.16  0.11  42  0.22  0.09 
(Proportion)  (0.18)  (0.14)  (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.04) -36-  
 
Table II 
Summary statistics for dependent variables and control variables 
While regressions are run in changes, we report means of levels and changes of the variables.  Panel A shows summary statistics for the full sample.  Panels B and C report these statistics for 
banks with regulatory interventions and capital support.  Risk is measured as risk-weighted assets divided by total assets (RWA/TA).  Liquidity creation is calculated using our Mat Cat Fat 
measure.  The controls include total assets (natural log used in regressions); return on equity (net income divided by equity capital); loan portfolio concentration (a Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
measuring loan portfolio concentration); the number of branch offices; interest rate spread (between a 10-year and a 1-year German government bond); and public and cooperative bank dummies 
(the private bank dummy is excluded as the base case).  Liquidity creation and total assets are measured in real € 2000. 
 
  Panel A: Full sample  Observations  Mean of  level  Mean of change 
Dependent variables   Risk (RWA/TA)  17,662  0.60  -0.02 
  Liquidity creation in million € (Mat Cat Fat)  17,662  602.00      0.22 
Control variables  Total assets in million €   17,662  2,400.00  0.02 
  Return on equity  17,662  0.11  -0.04 
  Loan portfolio concentration  17,662  0.31  0.02 
  Bank branches  17,662  19.66  -0.59 
  Interest rate spread  17,662  0.01  0.01 
  Private bank  17,662  0.08  n/a 
  Public bank  17,662  0.26  n/a 
  Cooperative bank  17,662  0.66  n/a 
  Panel B: Banks with regulatory interventions       
Dependent variables  Risk (RWA/TA)  452  0.63  0.00 
  Liquidity creation in million € (Mat Cat Fat)  452  1,130.00  0.19 
Control variables  Total assets in million €  452  4,410.00  0.02 
  Return on equity  452  0.06  0.06   
  Loan portfolio concentration  452  0.29     0.05 
  Bank branches  452  16.02  -0.48   
  Interest rate spread  452  0.01    0.01 
  Private bank  452  0.04  n/a 
  Public bank  452  0.05  n/a 
  Cooperative bank  452  0.91  n/a 
  Panel C: Banks with capital support       
Dependent variables  Risk (RWA/TA)  371  0.61  -0.02 
  Liquidity creation in million € (Mat Cat Fat)  371  542.00  0.18  
Control variables  Total assets in million €  371  3,480.00  -0.02 
  Return on equity  371  0.03  0.03 
  Loan portfolio concentration  371  0.31  0.04 
  Bank branches  371  17.61  -1.13 
  Interest rate spread  371  0.01  0.01   
  Private bank  371  0.07    n/a 
  Public bank  371  0.06     n/a 
  Cooperative bank  371  0.86  n/a 
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Table III 
Main regression results 
We estimate ordered logit models for changes in risk and liquidity creation.  The dependent variable takes on the value 1 if there was a drop in risk (Panel A) or liquidity creation (Panel B) of at least 
3% relative to the previous year, it takes on the value 2 if risk (Panel A) or liquidity creation (Panel B) remained within the interval +/- 3%, and it takes on the value 3 if there was an increase in risk 
(Panel A) or liquidity creation (Panel B) of more than 3%.  All variables are defined in the notes to Table II.  The dummy for private banks is omitted to avoid perfect collinearity.  All variables enter 
the regression in changes, unless dummy variables are used.  We report odds ratios, and test the null hypothesis that the odds ratios are significantly different from one.  Robust z-statistics are presented 
in brackets.  *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  Panel A: Risk  
(∆ RWA/TA) 
Panel B: Liquidity creation 
(∆ LC) 
Variable of interest     
Regulatory interventions  0.7819***  0.6398*** 
  [-2.73]  [-5.02] 
Capital support  0.9818***  0.9839*** 
  [-3.52]  [-3.47] 
Control variables      
∆ Log total assets  1.0518***  1.0365*** 
  [14.99]  [11.98] 
∆ Return on equity  0.9885***  1.0015 
  [-7.03]  [0.97] 
∆ Loan portfolio concentration  0.9954  1.0041 
  [-0.68]  [0.66] 
∆ Bank branches   1.0226**  1.0357*** 
  [2.06]  [2.87] 
∆ Interest rate spread   2.2491***  1.3606*** 
  [31.97]  [12.42] 
Public bank dummy  1.4290***  1.5082*** 
  [4.60]  [6.08] 
Cooperative bank dummy  1.1508*  1.3452*** 
  [1.87]  [4.63] 
α1  1.4235***  0.9125 
  [4.41]  [-1.33] 
α2   10.8454***  1.8456*** 
  [28.55]  [8.90] 
Observations  17,662  17,662 
Pseudo R-squared  0.039  0.011 
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Table IV 
Subsample results for banks split by banking pillar, size, capitalization, and subperiods 
This table presents results based on ordered logit models for different subsamples.  Subpanel I splits banks by banking pillar into private, public, and cooperative banks.  Subpanel II splits banks by 
size into small and large banks, i.e., banks with assets below and above the median, respectively.  Subpanel III splits banks by capitalization into poorly- and well-capitalized banks, i.e., banks with 
capital below and above the median capital adequacy ratio (Tier 1 plus tier 2 capital/Risk-weighted assets), respectively.  Subpanel IV splits the sample into non-crisis years (1999-2000 and 2002-
2006) and crisis years (2001, 2007-2009).  Panels A and B present the risk and liquidity creation results, respectively.  The dependent variable takes on the value 1 if there was a drop in risk (Panel 
A) or liquidity creation (Panel B) of at least 3% relative to the previous year, it takes on the value 2 if risk (Panel A) or liquidity creation (Panel B) remained within the interval +/- 3%, and it takes 
on the value 3 if there was an increase in risk (Panel A) or liquidity creation (Panel B) of more than 3%.  All control variables used in Table III are included but not shown due to space constraints.  






























Panel A: Risk (∆ RWA/TA)           
Regulatory interventions  1.0988  1.1169  0.7470***  0.7158***  0.9012  0.7066***  0.9165  0.6716***  0.7997 
  [0.15]  [0.28]  [-3.02]  [-2.91]  [-0.71]  [-3.03]  [-0.57]  [-3.57]  [-1.21] 
Capital support  0.9811  0.9715*  0.9828***  0.9842**  0.9791***  0.9827***  0.9807**  0.9760***  0.9775** 
  [-0.94]  [-1.80]  [-2.98]  [-2.13]  [-2.93]  [-2.58]  [-2.24]  [-3.83]  [-2.07] 
Observations  1,415  4,635  11,612  8,839  8,823  8,833  8,829  10,795  6,867   
Pseudo R-squared  0.007  0.051  0.049  0.04450  0.03788  0.046  0.033  0.022  0.160   
Panel B: Liquidity creation (∆ LC)           
Regulatory interventions  0.6623  0.2942***  0.6599***  0.7519**  0.5000***  0.5774***  0.7417**  0.6132***  0.6794** 
  [-0.74]  [-3.00]  [-4.41]  [-2.43]  [-5.02]  [-4.82]  [-1.99]  [-4.60]  [-2.41] 
Capital support  1.0052  0.9714  0.9830***  0.9919  0.9761***  0.9727***  1.0073  0.9812***  0.9907 
  [0.30]  [-1.59]  [-3.34]  [-1.23]  [-3.58]  [-4.73]  [0.84]  [-3.46]  [-1.03] 
Observations  1,415  4,635  11,612  8,839  8,823  8,833  8,829  10,795  6,867   
Pseudo R-squared  0.013  0.006  0.016  0.015  0.011  0.017  0.008  0.010  0.014   
 




This table presents ordered logit models that test the robustness of our main results. Panel A contains the risk regressions and Panel B shows the results for liquidity creation. All control variables 
used in Table III are included but not shown due to space constraints.  Subpanel I uses alternative cutoffs of 1% and 5% changes in risk and liquidity creation.  Subpanel II presents the results for 
banks that were engaged in merger activities during the sample period versus banks that were not involved in such activities.  Subpanel III use alternative dependent variables: an alternative 
(inverse) risk taking measure defined as Tier 1 equity capital divided by risk-weighted assets, and three alternative liquidity creation measures which decompose total liquidity creation into asset-
based, liability-based, and off-balance sheet-based liquidity creation.  We report odds ratios and test the null hypothesis that the odds ratios are significantly different from one.  Robust z-statistics 









Alternative  dependent variables 
Panel A: Risk (∆ RWA/TA)  1% change  5% change  Merged banks only  Merged banks excluded  Insolvency risk (∆ Tier 1/RWA) 
Regulatory interventions  0.7952**  0.8484*  0.7640*  0.7875**  0.8285** 
  [-2.37]  [-1.64]  [-1.68]  [-2.18]  [-1.99] 
Capital support  0.9821***  0.9840***  0.9924  0.9723***  0.9867*** 
  [-3.61]  [-2.93]  [-1.00]  [-3.80]  [-2.64] 
Observations  17,662  17,662  5,506  12,156  17,662   
Pseudo R-squared  0.030  0.055  0.050  0.034  0.011   
Wald test Chi-squared  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a   
Panel B: Liquidity creation (∆ LC)  1% change  5% change  Merged banks only  Merged banks excluded  ∆ LC assets  ∆ LC liabilities  ∆ LC off-balance sheet 
Regulatory interventions  0.6791***  0.6634***  0.5545***  0.6942***  0.7283***  1.0228  0.6701*** 
  [-4.06]  [-4.65]  [-3.74]  [-3.37]  [-3.28]  [0.24]  [-4.10] 
Capital support  0.9863***  0.9826***  0.9915  0.9789***  0.9896**  1.0006  0.9824*** 
  [-2.95]  [-3.67]  [-1.23]  [-3.30]  [-2.17]  [0.13]  [-3.95] 
Observations  17,662  17,662  5,506  12,156  17,662  17,662  17,607   
Pseudo R-squared  0.011  0.011  0.016  0.009  0.013  0.012  0.009   
Wald test Chi-squared  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a   
 
 
   -40-  
 
Table VI 
Instrumental variable regressions  
This table presents the results of IV ordered probit models to deal with a potential endogeneity issue: bank distress may result in both regulatory interventions and capital support on the one hand, 
and reductions in risk taking and liquidity creation on the other hand.  We estimate two systems of equations: one system for the effects of regulatory interventions and capital support on risk 
taking, and a separate system for the effects of these actions on liquidity creation.  For ease of exposition, we use the terms “first-stage” and “second-stage” regressions in our discussion, but 
emphasize that both are jointly estimated.  Panels A and B present the risk and liquidity creation results, respectively.  Our second-stage dependent variables (∆ RWA/TA and ∆ LC) take on take on 
the value 1 if there was a drop in the dependent variable by at least 3%, they take on the value 2, if the dependent variable remained within a range of +/- 3%, and they take on the value 3 if the 
dependent variable increased by more than 3%.  Each panel also presents results for the estimation of the two first stage regressions.  Regulatory intervention first-stage regressions are probit 
regressions that use the following instruments: Capital support at the county level; a Special audit dummy; and the levels of the Capital adequacy ratio, Loan loss provisions ratio, and Risk. Capital 
support first-stage regressions are OLS regressions that include all the instruments used in the regulatory intervention regressions plus the Shares of conservative, liberal, and green voters (county 
level) and dummy variables for membership in regional Bankers Associations.  All control variables used in Table III are included but not shown for space constraints.  We report coefficients 
because exponentiated probit coefficients cannot be interpreted as odds ratios as in logit models.  To test the joint significance of the Bankers Association dummies, we present F-tests.  Robust z-
statistics are presented in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  Panel A: Risk  Panel B: Liquidity creation  
Dependent variable  Regulatory interventions  Capital support  (∆ RWA/TA)  Regulatory interventions  Capital support   (∆ LC) 
Estimation method  Probit  OLS  Ordered Probit  Probit  OLS  Ordered Probit 
Variables of interest in 2
nd stage             
Regulatory interventions (instrumented)      -0.6243**      -0.9271*** 
      [-2.09]      [-3.84] 
Capital support (instrumented)      -0.1802***      -0.1225*** 
      [-5.92]      [-6.42] 
             
Instruments in 1
st stage             
Capital support at the county level  0.0010  0.0215***    0.0009  0.0246***   
  [0.64]  [9.2140]    [0.60]  [13.49]   
Special audit dummy  0.0402  -0.0217    0.0473  0.0406   
  [0.58]  [-0.36]    [0.69]  [0.64]   
Capital adequacy ratio (level)  -0.0623***  -0.0093    -0.0657***  -0.0195***   
  [-6.31]  [-1.34]    [-6.69]  [-2.76]   
Loan loss provisions ratio (level)  0.5567***  0.8985***    0.5856***  0.9851***   
  [12.88]  [15.28]    [13.91]  [19.97]   
Risk (level)  -0.0089***  0.0052*    -0.0117***  -0.0076***   
  [-3.25]  [1.85]    [-5.04]  [-3.45]   
Share of conservative voters (county)    0.0063**      -0.0036   
    [2.06]      [-1.39]   
Share of liberal voters (county)    0.0125      -0.0080   
    [1.54]      [-0.97]   
Share of green voters (county)    0.0202***      0.0141**   
    [3.09]      [2.01]   
Bankers Association dummies  No  Yes    No  Yes   
      F-test for joint significance  n/a  83.22***    n/a  76.37***   
Observations  17,039  17,039  17,039  17,039  17,039  17,039 




This table examines the long-run effects  of regulatory interventions and capital support on bank risk taking (Panel A) and liquidity creation (Panel B) by comparing the  median 
nationwide percentile rank in risk and liquidity creation market share in years t and t+5 of banks that received regulatory interventions and capital support in year t.  A bank’s liquidity 
creation market share is calculated by dividing its liquidity creation by the German banking system’s liquidity creation in that year.  Results are presented for the full sample; and for 
small and large banks (below and above median assets, respectively).  Only banks that received regulatory interventions and/or capital support in year t and are still in the sample in year 
t+5 are included in this analysis.   
 
    Regulatory interventions    Capital support 
  Obs  t  t+5  Obs  t  t+5 
Panel A: Risk taking (nationwide percentile rank)             
All banks  275  56.20  48.10  234  58.40  42.20 
Small banks  145  58.50  47.80  101  58.60  42.00 
Large banks  130  56.15  48.20  133  58.20     42.30 
Panel B: Liquidity creation market share (nationwide percentile rank)              
All banks  275  54.80  46.10  235  58.70  48.30 
Small banks  144  33.20  27.30  102  43.60  34.20 
Large banks  131  73.00  65.60  133  73.90  64.80 
 
 